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Professor Scott Hughes has performed a great service in his Article
To the Spoiled Go the Privileges Every proposed uniform law needs a
solid, detailed history of its evolution. While the Reporters performed
exceptionally well with regard to the commentary, Professor Hughes
was not subject to the same constraints.3 Since a uniform act is the
product of innumerable hours of joint work by commissioners,
committees, members of professional associations, practitioners, and
academics, the act and its accompanying report necessarily lose a certain
edge. Indeed, these varied, unofficial constituencies carefully scour the
Reporters' work to create a document as smooth and as free as possible
1. Professor of Law and Director, Center on Alternative Dispute Resolution and
the Early Settlement Central Mediation Program, Oklahoma City University School of Law.
B.A. cum laude 1976, Bryn Mawr College; M.A. 1978, Columbia University College of Arts
and Sciences; J.D. 1981, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Professor Bernard serves on
the governing Council of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and as a Vice-Chair for the
Section's Ethics Committee. She also serves on the governing Council of the ABA Section of
Administrative Law & Regulatory Practice. Earlier versions of some material in this paper
were presented at the ABA Dispute Resolution Section Fall Meeting, St. Petersburg, FL,
December 2, 2000, and at the ABA Mediation Workshop for Judges, Los Angeles, CA,
February 20,2001.
2. This Article was prepared in response to Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform
Mediation Act: To The Spoiled Go The Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9 (2001) [hereinafter
Hughes Article]. This Article shall refer to the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, DRAFT UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT WITH
PREFATORY NOTE AND REPORTER'S NOTES (May 2001) [hereinafter MAY 2001 DRAFT].
All citations to the MAY 2001 DRAFT will be followed by sections in brackets that reference
the final version of the UMA [hereinafter UMA] that is printed in full in the pages that
follow within this edition of the Marquette Law Review. There will not, however, be
corresponding sections to the Prefatory Note or Reporter's Notes because these portions of
the final UMA were not completed at the time of publication.
3. The amount and quality of work performed by Professor Nancy Rogers and her
Deputy Reporter, Professor Richard Reuben, was especially impressive. The Reporter's
Notes are traditionally so helpful that they comprise the official record of a uniform act's
conception and development.
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from potential problems. A uniform act and its commentary become
more coherent as the drafting process extends, and until the product can
be successfully vetted to the full National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the American Bar Association
House of Delegates, and state legislative bodies nationwide.
Professor Hughes stepped into this moderating process with an
independent eye. He took measure of the proposed Uniform Mediation
Act (UMA) free from the necessary restrictions imposed upon the
official Reporters who must be held accountable to an assorted
professional public. Hughes's record presents a meticulous
chronological exposition of each draft from his vantage point on the
sidelines as well as on the playing field. Hughes discusses the UMA's
impact on who can refuse to testify regarding communications made
during a mediation and under what circumstances. Specifically, he
analyzes the following question: What can and should be done to rectify
a mediated settlement agreement for which one side essentially has
"buyer's remorse" ?4
A party may seek to set aside a mediated agreement because some
clear act of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation occurred in the
mediation. This behavior may not have been either identified or
identifiable at the time of the mediation. Nevertheless, its presence
might implicate the doctrine of unconscionability. Was the conduct or
communication of such an unfair nature that the agreement should be
vitiated? The difficult part arises when the mediator is the only non-
interested person that could testify concerning the allegedly improper
conduct.
The reader does not know whether Professor Hughes's hypothetical
scenarios are fictionalized versions of actual cases with names and
certain facts altered to shield identities. Regardless, for many mediators
these anecdotes echo their harrying nightmares. This pinpoints
Hughes's principal criticism of the UMA as summarized in the title of
his article. As he sees it, the UMA exists largely to protect mediators
from their own worst fears rather than to protect the public from abuse
within the mediation process. One could fairly conceptualize his thesis
as arguing that the UMA has evolved through its many drafts into a law
designed to give maximum protection or, even insulation to the
mediator, with little or no parallel protection for the parties. Hughes
presents the UMA as codifying customs and practices that so coddle and
4. See infra note 31 and accompanying text for explanation of this term.
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comfort the mediator, that they could be called "spoiled."5
Hughes would prefer to remove that insulation. In his Article, he
argues, " [w]hen challenges arise to an agreement reached in mediation,
the mediator should be treated like all other mediation participants-he
or she should be required to testify."6 He posits that the value placed on
protecting the real and perceived integrity of the mediation process
should be no more important than protecting the parties' right to self-
determination. If a party decides that the mediator should testify
concerning a mediation communication or conduct, then the mediator
should testify out of respect for the parties' right to waive whatever
privilege may have attached.7
In many ways this position represents significant growth in Professor
Hughes's own evolving dialectic on mediation. In 1998, he espoused the
provocative position that confidentiality has no general place in
mediation.8 This is a controversial but readily understood argument in
the context of mediating with governmental entities. Doctrines of
openness in government activities all militate in favor of disclosure and
against private deals because public policy, public resources, and public
impacts are at issue. Confidentiality and accountability do not make
easy companions in the public arena.'
Professor Hughes's position is noteworthy because he proposes that,
even in private sector transactions, there is no sound basis for assuring
confidentiality. He offers a radical challenge to the fundamental
philosophy and practice of confidentiality by questioning why one
5. Professor Hughes implicates but does not assert the economic analysis of Larry
E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996). Ribstein and Kobayashi test the hypothesis that "the NCCUSL
helps interest groups and other participants in the process secure adoption of inefficient laws
by serving such functions as lobbying and coordinating the efforts of interest groups." Id. at
132. After performing an exhaustive series of regression analyses, the authors conclude that
"evidence of the NCCUSL's effect on which laws are passed, coupled with our hypothesis
that the NCCUSL will tend to propose laws that favor particular groups, suggests that the
problems of differing state laws with which the NCCUSL is intended to deal might be better
solved in other ways, particularly by enforcing contractual choice of law." Id. at 133.
6. Hughes Article, supra note 2, at 77.
7. See id. at 37-38.
8. Scott H. Hughes, A Closer Look-The Case for a Mediation Confidentiality
Privilege Still Has Not Been Made, 5 DISP. RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 14.
9. This particular issue has been the focus of extraordinary scrutiny over the past
two years. This concern was instigated by the controversial action of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Justice to seize mediation records regarding a
foreclosure dispute from the USDA certified agriculture mediation program at Texas A&M
University. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 148 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 1998).
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should assume the need for confidentiality and whether confidentiality,
when provided, has made a marginal difference in the outcome of
mediations. Hughes states that "there is almost no empirical support for
mediation privileges." 0
Between 1998 and today, Professor Hughes perhaps recognized that
although this rationale is superficially attractive, its foundation is
insubstantial. The argument could quickly slide into the fallacy logicians
have dubbed "the appeal to ignorance."" In a basic sense, Hughes's
argument would be: "We have no data to show the privilege is needed;
therefore, we can safely eliminate it." The fallacy of this proof is that
one could just as readily argue that because there are no contrary data,
there is just as much reason to preserve the practice of assuring
confidentiality.
Arguably, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) development
is still in its infancy. A sufficient body of empirical evidence as a result
of longitudinal studies has yet to be compiled that could resolve a
rational argument one way or the other. Indeed, one could ask whether
empirical data of any sort could truly answer this confidentiality
question since the relevant factors may not be susceptible to
quantification. Given these currently insuperable barriers, there
appears to be even more reason in the interim to preserve
confidentiality protections due to the expectations of privacy and trust
that have accrued over time.'"
These institutionalized expectations of confidentiality are far from
ephemeral. They are embodied and embedded in the laws protecting
statements made in settlement negotiations, deriving from statutes,
10. Hughes, supra note 8, at 14.
11. IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 116 (9th ed.
1994) (describing this fundamental and pervasive principle of logic). The argument from
ignorance or argument ad ignorantiam is defined as "the mistake that is committed when it is
argued that a proposition is true simply on the basis that it has not been proved false, or that
it is false because it has not been proved true." Id. As the authors point out:
Those who strongly oppose some great change are often tempted to argue against
the change on the ground that it has not yet been proved workable or safe. Such
proof is often impossible to provide in advance, and the appeal of the objection is
commonly to ignorance mixed with fear. Such an appeal often takes the form of
rhetorical questions that suggest, but do not flatly assert, that the proposed changes
are full of unknown peril. Policy changes may be supported, as well as opposed, by
an appeal to ignorance.
Id. at 117.
12. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION-
NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 419-443 (3d ed. 1999).
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procedural rules, evidentiary rules, and case law. Federal Rule of
Evidence 408 and its state analogs, through interpretation by courts over
several decades, have built a wall of protection around settlement
discussions for the purpose of encouraging parties to move away from
their aggressively stated legal positions and find a common ground upon
which to resolve the dispute. Ostensibly, by assuring that statements
made in settlement discussions will not be used in court, parties may
take the risk of, for example, apologizing without being terribly
apprehensive that the apology will be seen as a legal admission of guilt.
14
Granted, this wall of protection has recently suffered breaches and
become porous. 5  Nevertheless, the presumption remains that
statements made during settlement negotiations will not be used against
a party.
Recognizing that the evidentiary rules and other applicable statutes
may create an already sufficiently porous barrier, most prudent
observers have elected not to suggest any further reductions. One can
readily appreciate why after looking at the system. Alternative dispute
resolution, as the name implies, exists to offer an alternative to the
standard operating procedures of litigation. In litigation, few, if any,
13. See, eg., id. at 420 (stating "[m]ore than 200 state and federal statutes and
scores of reported decisions relate to mediation confidentiality"). In researching and drafting
the UMA, the Reporters have probably conducted the most exhaustive and well-summarized
review in recent memory of evidentiary rules concerning privilege. See MAY 2001 DRAFT,
supra note 2, § 5 Reporter's Notes.
14. See, eg., Deborah L. Levi, Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1165 (1997) (the leading article explicating the pros and cons of this issue); Jonathan
R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009 (1999).
15. For a helpful discussion of FED R. EVID. 408 and its recent evolutions, in fight
of claims by the Office of the Inspector General for the USDA that mediations concerning
public monies are not necessarily confidential and statements made therein are not
necessarily privileged, see Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The
Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REv. 91 (1999). Professor
Lynne H. Rambo has provided a thorough analysis to support her thesis that before a
statement made in settlement discussions-including mediation-could be used to impeach a
party at trial, it should be necessary to show intentional misrepresentation. See Lynne H.
Rambo, Impeaching Lying Parties with Their Statements During Negotiation: Demysticizing
the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation Privilege Statutes, 75
WASH. L. Rnv. 1037 (2000). Professor Rambo acknowledges that as of yet we lack a
sufficient body of case law to understand the dynamics of granting or removing a privilege.
Id. at 1065. However, she also pursues Professor Hughes's logic that because there is little or
no empirical evidence demonstrating the positive value of confidentiality in mediation or in
settlement negotiations generally, the public policy rationale is merely of a "mythical nature."
Id. at 1066. I would suggest that the choice of the word "mythical" is highly appropriate,
insofar as myths embody powerful cultural norms that shape a society and its expectations of,
among other things, justice.
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protections exist to create a safe venue for parties to go beyond the
publicly stated legal arguments and alleged facts. Negotiated settlement
conferences and mediation exist to provide reasonable protections for
such risk-taking. Further, it is abundantly clear that parties do take risks
by lowering their shields to engage in informal, conciliatory discussions
outside of court.
6
These concerns meld to form the core considerations that attorneys
(both litigators and transactional lawyers), judges, and legislators have
wrestled with to determine whether to further encourage ADR"
Viewed from a more idealistic perspective, it is desirable to offer parties
the opportunity to avoid becoming unnecessarily enmeshed in the
quagmire of litigation. Litigation is stressful and expensive, and parties
lose the power of self-determination. 8 A pragmatic perspective would
view the reduction of court dockets as improving efficiency and lowering
costs. 9 When litigants resolve their cases without trial, courts' caseloads
diminish, and judges have more time to hear cases that truly require
their special intervention. As of today, the expectation of
confidentiality constitutes a single feature that distinguishes negotiated
settlement and its corollary, mediation, from litigation. If confidentiality
is lost or significantly compromised, a serious question would arise as to
whether these ADR processes can continue to offer a genuine
alternative to the court room.
In fact, mediation without the presumption of confidentiality might
produce precisely the type of "second-class justice" that is so vigorously
argued against by critics.2' It would create a setting where parties
16. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 12, at 10-11.
17. Risks are taken individually, and by the entire system of justice. See Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (presenting the landmark article). Fiss
explains that private ordering of the law can lead to injustice against parties and, ultimately,
to a warping of the public law, fostering unpredictability and inequities in results. Id. Indeed,
the very concept of undertaking conciliatory discussions challenges the prevailing paradigm of
adversarial lawyering. Id. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: New Issues, No Answer from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'
Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 407 (1997) (presenting additionally influential work in the
area).
18. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 12, at 172-75.
19. Id. at 8.
20. Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR:
Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good Faith Participation, Autonomy, and
Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591 (2001) (arguing that, while confidentiality is important, good
faith participation deserves equal weight).
21. Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985) (the leading critic
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undertook the risks of litigation without the protections of the judge's
presence and applicable court rules, as well as perhaps without the
protections of the substantive law and legal counsel.
II. FROM RESISTANCE TO RAPPROCHEMENT
Professor Hughes seeks to assure party self-determination by
allowing mediators and parties to testify about mediation
communications. There is another approach to reach the same goal of
supporting party self-determination. With this approach, there is a
different place of emphasis. Rather than concentrating on how to
remedy ill-managed mediations after the fact, it is more important to
focus on the mediation process itself. Contemporaneous mechanisms
should be installed that assure that the process, as it takes place, protects
party self-determination.
It appears to be somewhat of an oxymoron to speak of uniformity
and mediation in the same breath.22 Is it not the purpose of mediation to
create a true alternative to the court room, by offering all the flexibility
and organic variations that must exist in order to meet the different
needs of real people? A uniform act designed to "simplify," "clarify," or
"make reasonably consistent" the various rules governing mediation
throughout the United States, nearly by definition, threatens to chill the
innovations in mediation that give the process value.'
on this subject). See also Richard Delgado, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Conflict as
Pathology: An Essay for Trina Grillo, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1391 (1997) [hereinafter Conflict as
Pathology]; Eric Q. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341 (1990); Michelle G. Hermann, The Dangers of
ADR: A Three-Tiered System of Justice, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117 (1989) (addressing
concerns about economic influences on access to skilled ADR providers).
22. Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi argue that uniform laws reduce innovation
and experimentation: "A decentralized decision-making process normally can produce more
possible solutions to a problem than could a single rulemaker. As a result, innovation and
experimentation through a decentralized lawmaking process may produce at least some laws
that are better than what a single uniform lawmaker could write." See Ribstein & Kobayashi,
supra note 6, at 140-41. Further, they argue that "[e]ven if a decentralized process is unlikely
to produce 'better' rules through experimentation and innovation, it may produce rules that
are well suited to particular localities or uses." Id. at 141.
23. This criticism is not unique to the UMA. This concern inheres in every
uniform act undertaken by NCCUSL. Professors Ribstein and Kobayashi's economic
analysis concludes that "in many cases, reliance on... centralized lawmaking bodies such as
the NCCUSL to produce uniformity may be both unnecessary and perverse." Id. at 131.
Professor Fred Miller, Executive Director of NCCUSL, explained the two part process set
forth in NCCUSL's 1988 Statement of Policy Relating to Consideration of Acts:
One is there must be an obvious reason for an act on the subject, and, coupled with
2001]
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This process of mediation has flourished in America during the last
couple of decades on the basis of three promises made explicitly and
implicitly. First, mediation promises a flexible, user-friendly process
capable of responding quickly to the needs of the participants.24 Second,
it promises participants an empowering venue in which they can directly
craft a resolution that meets their interests, however they might define
those interests.' Finally, mediation promises differing levels of privacy
that fashion a safe harbor, which allows participants to take risks either
not permitted or not prudent in a trial setting.'
In those areas where voluntary mediation is growing rapidly, people
appear willing to make the following tradeoff: they value privacy and
flexibility enough to merit relinquishing the protections of the
courtroom. Would the cost-benefit calculus continue to favor mediation
if the process became increasingly restricted and resembled a pale
imitation of trial? In application, it may become non-binding arbitration
in disguise. A further consideration is what interest would remain, if
any, in utilizing a mediation process that could not even offer assurances
that, there should be a reasonable probability the act can be enacted in a substantial
number of jurisdictions, or that it will promote uniformity indirectly, such as by
serving as a model for States that are interested in legislation in the area. Second,
there also must be a prospect of significant benefit. In other words, the problem
should have some significance. It is also important that the proposed act make a
contribution that is substantial in relation to other competing projects. And finally,
the subject should not be one that is entirely novel, or one on which some
experience is lacking, or where it is a local problem; these are not good conditions
for uniformity.
Fred Miller, The View from Experience, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624 (2001). Professor Miller's
presentation of NCCUSL's criteria would suggest that mere inconsistency in law from state to
state is not in and of itself enough to mandate a uniform act. To merit NCCUSL action,
"significant disadvantages" must arise "from diversity of state law." Id. at 622. Importantly,
NCCUSL also has authority to propose model acts as templates for states which lack
legislative resources or desire a standard reflecting a consensus of widespread expertise. See
id. at 621-22.
24. See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 123.
25. But see Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the
Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992) [hereinafter Killing Us Softly]; Penelope E.
Bryan, Reclaiming Professionalism: The Lawyer's Role in Divorce Mediation, 28 FAM. L.Q.
177 (1994) [hereinafter Reclaiming Professionalism].
26. See MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 2, § 2 Reporter's Notes. Some of the risks
of mediating without the protection of confidentiality, however, go beyond mere legal
strategy and raise issues of protection from physical and psychological threats and abuse. See
e.g., Bryan, Killing Us Softly, supra note 25 (detailing the dynamics of coercion and power
imbalance in family mediation, focusing on disadvantages to the woman); Bryan, Reclaiming
Professionalism, supra note 25 (explaining what actions the attorney is ethically bound to take
when confronting severe power imbalances in mediation; namely, the attorney's duty may be
to refuse mediation and to negotiate on her client's behalf).
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of privacy? It is arguable that, in time, only mandatory referrals to
mediation or those mediations that occur due to little-understood ADR
clauses in adhesion contracts would survive in large numbers. Given
sufficient publicity concerning the coercive, disempowering nature of
such mediations, even these required mediations would eventually fall
into disfavor and disuse.
The apprehensions expressed here have not abated. This lends
recognition to the fact that despite the validity of these concerns,
opposition to the UMA smacks of unintended hypocrisy. Like many
lawyers who prefer to consider themselves free from jingoistic
tendencies, this author supports the principle of emerging global villages
and the increasing harmonization of laws. In other words, the
broadening of legal structures transnationally, regionally, or nationally
involves important personal interest matters. This selective application
of principles suggests an intellectual version of the classic NIMBY ("not
in my backyard") that was made infamous in zoning disputes. A
proposed uniform act that threatens to undercut a progressive, mature
mediation statute and supreme court rules in my "own back yard"
should be resisted.
Once distilled, the issue is whether to honor the overarching
principle that laws should move at least towards harmonization or
compatibility, if not towards one coherent regional structure of laws. In
the alternative, the issue is whether that type of macro theory should
yield to the micro realities of states like Oklahoma and Florida, whose
sophisticated court mediation programs far surpass anything
encompassed by the UMA.27 Language in the May 4, 2001 draft of the
27. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1801-1813 (West 1993) (citing the Oklahoma
Dispute Resolution Act (the "Act") and implemented court rules in Appendices A-C). This
1983 statute created the court-annexed mediation program for the state of Oklahoma. Id. §
1803. The Act established funding and mandated that mediators include a broad cross-
section of residents. Id. Additionally, the Act vested authority in the Administrator of the
Administrative Office of the Courts to develop and implement necessary rules, as well as
select, supervise, train, certify, and monitor the mediators. Id. The Act provides for
voluntary participation in a purely facilitative model of mediation. Id. §§ 1803-1805.
Mediator and party information are confidential and privileged. Id. § 1805. This protection
extends to all "files, reports, interviews, memoranda, case summaries, or notes and work
products of the mediator." Id. § 1805(A), app. C. No mediator nor materials subject to the
Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act may be subpoenaed. Id. § 1805(C). The privilege can,
however, be waived if a civil action were brought against the mediator. Id. § 1805(E).
Additionally, mediators have qualified immunity when operating under the statute. Id. §
1805, app. A. Appendix A contains the Code of Professional Conduct for Mediators which
was adopted by court rule in 1986. Id. Appendix B sets forth the Agreement to Mediate
which requires the parties to consent to good faith participation. Id. app. B. It also puts in
writing the caveat presented at the outset of any mediation under the statute: "We
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UMA, coupled with assurances by the NCCUSL drafting committee
through its Chair, Honorable Michael Getty, contributed greatly to
finding a workable balance.
Uniform laws have often faced informal, anecdotal claims that they
simplify practices in order to create an artificial level of conduct around
which innumerable constituencies can coalesce. Without pronouncing
the UMA as the "lowest common denominator," in a December 2000
joint meeting, the Commissioners and the governing Council of the
American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution endorsed the
characterization of the UMA as establishing a base or a starting block
for mediation laws in any given state. States would be encouraged to do
more, but not less, if it suited their particularized needs.' Moreover, as
Judge Getty explained, the UMA was not intended to displace systems
for financing and administering court-connected mediation programs.
Furthermore, the UMA is not, in itself, a comprehensive statutory
scheme. It does not, for example, address funding, mediator training, or
certification.
Despite the limited focus of the UMA or, more accurately, the
"uniform confidentiality in mediation act," some elements of the
surviving draft address deeper, quite critical concerns. Some UMA
provisions could affect party empowerment in a pro-active, prescriptive
manner, rather than attempting to only cure retroactive problems.
Properly applied and interpreted, these provisions could perhaps bring a
committed resister to the point of attempting a rapprochement with the
UMA.
understand that any information received by a mediator or a person employed to assist a
mediator is privileged and confidential. However, a mediator must disclose information
brought to his/her attention that an elderly person, or a person with disabilities, or a child
under the age of eighteen (18) has been physically abused or neglected." Id. Appendix C
elaborates upon the Confidentiality of Proceedings, including Rule 10 governing the conduct
of outside parties, and providing for attorney or non-attorney assistance to a party. Id. app.
C. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 44.1011, 44.102-.201 (West 1998) (creating Florida's court-
connected mediation program). One of Florida's most valuable contributions to the field is
its system of published ethics opinions concerning mediator conduct. See, e.g., In re
Amendments to the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators, 762 So. 2d
441 (Fla. 2000). In re Amendments discusses not only the court-annexed program's ethics
rules 10.300-.380 concerning the mediator's responsibilities to the party, but also analyzes
those rules with respect to particular fact situations requiring the court's advice. Id. This
allows the ethical structure of the program to grow in a considered manner, open to the
public's observation and education.
28. Professor Fred Miller, NCCUSL Executive Director, has described most of
NCCUSL's proposed statutes as "not mandatory." See Miller, supra note 23, at 628. He
characterized them as essentially "default rules." Id.
[85:113
THOUGHTS ON THE UMA
III. METHODOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON MEANING
One criticism of the UMA is its attempt to make law through
hypothetical. In other words, the UMA intensely concentrates on
protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications by
eliminating conflicts of law issues between differing state jurisdictions.
This is, of course, the primary rationale for creating any type of uniform
act. Despite that, how many cases can be cited that clearly demonstrate
a tangible, present, and pervasive problem with cross-border
confidentiality protections in mediations governed by state law? Not
the large number of cases that one would expect to find in order to
substantiate the need for state uniformity, even at the risk of
constricting state innovation. This, of course, concerns cases that offer
tangible, reviewable facts and law rather than just apprehensions for the
future.29
A much larger number of cases can be identified within the same
jurisdiction in which the mediator's confidentiality status was challenged
in a legal action.' This author has a strong bias in favor of self-
determination by state and local representatives of the people, through
their courts and legislatures, just as it is important to preserve individual
self-determination. Operating from this articulated bias, it is difficult to
see, even with this larger body of cases, a crisis that requires an
intervening uniform act. Throughout both the drafting process of the
UMA and within Professor Hughes's Article, various hypothetical
scenarios were woven and re-woven, and spun on top of each other into
a most intriguing design. No one, however, has yet articulated a clear,
measurable problem of sufficient magnitude to compel national
legislation to override states' own evolving, more subtle standards.
29. I speak here of cases where the system of judicial review and legislative
amendment already in place have not adequately resolved the policy issues raised. I speak
here of cases where the state processes failed, repeatedly, resulting in bad law and bad policy
which impact interstate commerce.
30. Two cases figure prominently and notoriously among this small assortment:
0am v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999), and Foxgate Homeowners'
Ass'n v. Bramalea, 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001). In Olam, the magistrate judge ordered the
breach of confidentiality to compel the mediator to testify in a consumer dispute with a
financial institution to help resolve a claim that undue influence had been exerted. 68 F.
Supp. 2d at 1110. In Foxgate, a retired judge sitting as a mediator filed a report with the court
when the court was considering sanctions on one of the parties. 25 P.3d at 1120. In both
cases, California law applied. In Foxgate, however, the California Supreme Court held that
there were no exceptions to the confidentiality of mediation communications or to the
statutory limits on the content of mediator's reports. Id. at 1128. In both Olam and Foxgate,




Generally, courts have affirmed the confidentiality of the mediation
process despite the "buyer's remorse," a term coined by the author, in
which a party seeks to repudiate a purported settlement agreement."
Interestingly, from time to time a court has required parties to exercise a
certain amount of due diligence and healthy skepticism despite the
presence of UMA section 9, which opens the door to counsel. Thus, a
party who claims that they were defrauded in a mediation may also be
required to show that they acted as a reasonably prudent person under
the circumstances. For example, did they request the information
necessary to make an informed decision? Further, did they act in a
timely manner to verify the information given or to rectify wrong
actions based upon the allegedly fraudulent information? 3
A smaller number of courts have permitted a limited inquiry into the
behavior of the mediation participants that requires carefully
constructed disclosure by the mediator.3 Disclosure may be required in
31. Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (prohibiting
disclosure in the settlement agreement enforcement action of testimony or documents related
to the court-ordered mediation); Kitchen v. Kitchen, 585 N.W.2d 47, 48 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that mediation documents are not admissible even if the information contained in
them has already been disclosed in other court documents); Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805,
810 (Ind. 2000) (explaining that oral mediation settlement agreements are not favored
because enforceability may require testimony of the mediator, which would breach
confidentiality); Anderson v. Anderson, 494 So. 2d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that
conduct or statements made during a mediation session are inadmissible in any judicial
proceeding); Cohen v. Cohen, 609 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
confidentiality of mediation discussions "should remain inviolate until a written agreement is
executed by the parties," at which time only the written agreement can be admitted into
evidence, not statements resulting in the agreement). Since the initial draft of this paper, I
returned to the on-line legal databases to update my previous research. Searching LEXIS, I
found nearly 40 cases concerning confidentiality of mediation communications that could
have been covered by the UMA, if adopted. In my brief summary here, I shall omit the
California cases, which Professor Hughes covered in such detail. In LEXIS, I chose: "States"
then "Courts" with a "Date Restriction" of "after 1980." My search terms were: "mediator or
mediation w/50 confidentiality or privilege but not labor." The search was conducted on
August 15, 2001.
32. In Glover v. Torrence, the mother came to the child support mediation with
documentation to prove her income, while the father brought no such verification. 723
N.E.2d 924 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The mother did not demand proof, and "took Father at his
word and then waited nearly four years after the judgment was entered to challenge" the
agreed upon support. Id. at 933. The court concluded, however, that the father's "false
verification of his income" was a breach of his duty as a father and, as a result, the court held
that the trial court "did not abuse its equitable discretion by affording relief from the 1994
judgment outside the one year limit." Id. at 941. Of course, in hindsight, an observer might
inquire whether the mediator had done all that was appropriate to assure the mother had all
the information she felt she needed to make an informed decision.
33. In re Paul Daley, 29 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that where the
trial court had ordered parties to attend mediation, the mediator could be examined on the
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order to verify whether there had, in fact, been coercion so extreme as
to void the settlement agreement.34  On rare occasions, a court has
upheld the general principle that mediators should not be compelled to
testify about confidential communications while at the same time, they
have distinguished the role of the mediator to carve out an exception to
this general rule.
3 1
This can be contrasted with other recent NCCUSL actions such as
child and family support enforcement, child custody, trust investing, and
computerized information. The Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act built upon the two following previous uniform laws: the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act37 and the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.3 8 The Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act seeks to eliminate multiple, conflicting orders that
make it difficult to calculate arrearages and enforce child support
orders. This was clearly not a solution in search of a problem. Decades
of work by NCCUSL and the U.S. Congress substantiated the need for
comprehensive legislation. Indeed, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) linked states'
adoption of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to states'
eligibility to receive federal funding of child support enforcement.39
limited question of whether the mediator had given permission for the party to leave).
34. Randle v. Mid Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292-CV, 1996 WL 447954 (Tex. App.
August 8, 1996) (involving a party alleging the mediator would not let him leave the session
until an agreement was reached even though he was experiencing chest pains).
35. Anderson v. Anderson, 514 S.E.2d 369 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining the
psychologist-mediator was acting more in the role of a therapist than a mediator). In
contrast, the court held in Marchal v. Craig, that despite the mediator's undisputed
simultaneous role as therapist in a child custody dispute, he could not provide evidence about
the case based upon information learned in mediation. 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997). The court interpreted the state ADR statute as requiring (1) "that which is disclosed
during the private caucus sessions will not be revealed to the opponent during the mediation,"
and (2) "that which transpires during the mediation is not used in any subsequent trial or
other proceeding." Id.
36. 9B U.L.A. 235 (1996 & Supp. 2001).
37. 9B U.L.A. 553 (1987 & Supp. 2001) (amended 1958).
38. 9B U.L.A. 381 (1987 & Supp. 2001).
39. PRWORA, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105. Section 321 of the PRWORA,
as amended by section 5537 of Pub. L. No. 105-33, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 666 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2001). See Mechelene DeMaria, Jurisdictional Issues Under the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act, 16 . AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 243 (1999); Patricia Wick Hatamyar,
Critical Applications and Proposals for Improvement of the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act and the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1
(1997); Linda D. Elrod, Child Support Reassessed. Federalization of Enforcement Nears
Completion, 97 U. ILL. L. REV. 695 (1997); Shannon Braden, Battling Deadbeat Parents: The
Constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery Act in Light of United States v. Lopez, 7 KAN.
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There was an unassailable rationale for uniformity. Courts were
overwhelmed with the volume of conflicts of law matters affecting
enforcement of child support orders across state lines.40 Data from state
and federal governments attested to the massive impact on interstate
commerce and travel.4' It is also relevant to consider the centuries of
statutory and common law that defined rights and obligations
concerning child custody. It was not until 1968, however, that NCCUSL
approved the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.4
2
NCCUSL's Uniform Prudent Investor Act sought to do more than
merely codify common law, as the Uniform Commercial Code had in
earlier generations. Like other uniform law projects, however, the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act was built upon the American Law
Institute's ("ALI") Restatement of Trusts ("Restatement"), a
substantial body of work developed over many years. 3  The
Restatement itself articulated centuries of guidance for prudent
investment of trust funds.4 Beginning in 1987, the ALI revisited the
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161 (1998).
40. See UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (1996)-Statutory Text,
Prefatory Note, and Commissioners' Comments-with More Unofficial Annotations by John J.
Sampson, 32 FAM. L.Q. 385 (1998).
41. See Elrod, supra note 39. Professor Elrod summarizes some of the financial
information relied upon in developing the reform proposals that resulted in the PRWORA
and its linkage to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. Id.
In 1991, 46% of the 11.5 million custodial parents potentially eligible for
child support did not have an award. Another 11% had an award, but
actually received nothing. Six and a half million families received no
payment at all. Only 24% of those potentially eligible both had an award
and received the full amount.
Id. at 697 n.14. According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, "although interstate cases
comprised 25.6% of total, only $2.50 in $10 was collected from interstate cases, and 34% of
mothers received nothing." Id. at 698 n.25 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT: MOTHERS REPORT RECEIVING LESS SUPPORT FROM OUT-
OF-STATE FATHERS 3,13 (HRD-92-39FS 1992)).
42. 9 U.L.A. pt.1, 262-63 (1999 & Supp. 2001). See also Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (1997), 9 U.L.A. 649 (1999 & Supp. 2001). For a helpful
discussion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and its interplay with state laws, see
Mary M. Beck, Adoption of Children in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REv. 423 (1998). See also
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy
for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1207 (1969); Anne B.
Goldstein, The Tragedy of the Interstate Child. A Critical Reexamination of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
845 (1992).
43. John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 641 (1996).
44. See id.
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Restatement to consider ways to bring this influential work in line with
more contemporary economic theory." In many ways, the Uniform
Prudent Investor Act represents a culmination of the effort to
incorporate the dominant theory of efficient markets, as enunciated in
Modem Portfolio Theory." The profound scholarly research underlying
this theory has resulted in four Nobel prizes in economics. 7
NCCUSL has not limited its contributions solely to reconciling
conflicts of long-established law that have grown over many decades.
The Commissioners have elected to act, however, when an abundance of
real world experience has demonstrated a tangible, verifiable need that
is sufficiently widespread to merit intervention. An intriguing dilemma
faced NCCUSL when it considered how to address the perceived need
to create a uniform platform of state laws concerning electronic
commerce in order to promote such a rapidly evolving activity. The
drafting committee for the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
ultimately determined that the marketplace for electronic commerce
was changing so rapidly and in such varied, unpredictable ways that it
would be unwise to draft detailed legal rules at that time. "
The best approach to consider the UMA was to follow the typical
NCCUSL methodology. The first open question to explore was whether
the cases from various jurisdictions around the nation dictated a need
for national legislation to create consistent laws about mediation at the
state level. Since the UMA does not cover labor-management cases,
they were omitted from consideration."9 In the following section of this
paper, there is a detailed examination of the key cases that emerged
from the search. For now, the following highlights what types of cases
were missing from the search results: a large body of non labor-
45. Id.
46. Id. at 642.
47. Id.
48. See Stephen Y. Chow, Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act:
UCITA: A 1990's Vision ofE-Commerce, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFo. L. 323,323
(1999).
49. MAY 2001 DRAFr, supra note 2, § 4(b)(1)-(2); [UMA § 3(b)(1)-(2)]. Labor
law is specifically excluded:
[T]he Act exempts certain classes of mediated disputes out of respect for
the unique public policies that override the need for uniformity under the
Act in those contexts. Collective bargaining disputes are excluded
because of the longstanding, solidified, and substantially uniform
mediation systems that already are in place in the collective bargaining
context.
Id. § 4 Reporter's Notes § 2.
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management cases challenging the mediation process itself, or the
mediator's status, or seeking disclosures by the mediator in subsequent
litigation; almost any non labor-management cases involving cross-
border, multi-jurisdictional issues of mediation procedure, evidence,
confidentiality or privileges; and almost any non labor-management
cases involving in-state conflicts or confusion concerning issues of
mediation procedure, evidence, confidentiality or privileges.
Following the methodology that NCCUSL has successfully
employed for many decades, the lesson learned may be that the call for
a uniform mediation act was premature. In the alternative, the
appropriate step would have been an act of broad, general principles
rather than detailed provisions, as the NCCUSL did with the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act. These proposals, however, may have been
too restrained and modest to satisfy the constituencies involved in the
drafting process. Additionally, the NCCUSL ought to have drafted a
model act to assist state legislatures in preparing their own, customized,
and comprehensive mediation statute. This goal appears to be the most
oft-repeated rationale for pursuing the UMA. The chosen vehicle
should match the destination.
Notwithstanding the above, a great deal of energy and effort has
gone into creating the UMA as it stands today. Further, the principle of
globalization might indeed also carry with it a certain appropriate
domestic inertia. If one assumes that a uniform act of some sort will be
adopted, then a suggestion would be to take a closer look at the cases.
There should also be a closer consideration of some of the UMA
provisions that are not a focus of Professor Hughes's article, but rather,
that could actually address some of the issues that do emerge from the
pertinent body of cases.
IV. CODIFYING PARTY EMPOWERMENT
Three short provisions of the UMA contain language that may
appear at first glance to be minor changes. Depending upon where one
lives, this language might represent no change at all in current
procedures employed by the mediation program(s) of that jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the potential impact of these changes could far exceed
their length because they address some of the critical issues that recur
most frequently in disputes about dispute resolution.
An analysis of approximately forty court and bar opinions illustrated
that the most frequently occurring matters were the following: conflicts
of interest, confidentiality, dual roles for attorney-mediator, the binding
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nature of mediated agreements, and good faith bargaining.' The UMA
directly tackles the issues of conflicts of interest and dual roles for the
attorney-mediator' The binding nature of mediated agreements and
good faith bargaining are handled indirectly, as explained below in
section IV.C. These matters shall be examined in terms of the generally
accepted principles that shape the appropriate behaviors of mediators
and the expectations of participants. The generally accepted principles
are the ethical standards for attorneys and for attorney-mediators that
have increasingly come to be honored as a workable measure to judge
the fairness of a mediation.'
A. Section 8(d) Mandatory Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest to Assure
Neutrality
Section 8 of the UMA, "Disclosure by Mediator," codifies what
should be standard practice for ethical mediators throughout the United
States.' Unfortunately, it is not necessarily consistently followed as a
matter of style. Depending upon language contained in legislation or
court rules, a mediator's failure to make mandatory disclosures might
pass with no penalty. Unenforceable mandates leave a mediation
participant with little or no meaningful, swift recourse. In systems
where there is no mandatory, affirmative obligation upon the mediator
50. This was a carefully conducted process. Rather than search the case files for
heuristic evidence to support a particular theory, the process was inverted. This began with
an extremely broad search request, using the state library of LEXIS on November 14, 2000 to
pull all cases within the last 10 years that concerned ethics or misconduct in mediation, but
not labor-management mediation. In the Lexis library, I chose "States," "File: Courts," and
my date restriction was "after 1990." My search terms were: "mediator or mediation w/50
ethics or misconduct but not labor or union." I chose "ethics" or "misconduct" as reasonably
consistent and comprehensive ways to describe the type of behavior that disadvantages a
party to mediation. This resulted in nearly 60 court decisions. To identify a body of cases
with a common thread of some sort, I selected those where the case: (1) involved an attorney-
mediator; and (2) involved one or more family members in a divorce, child custody matter, or
a family business dispute.
51. MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 2, § 8; [UMA §§ 7,9].
52. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, supra note 17; Michael Moffitt, Loyalty,
Confidentiality and Attorney-Mediators: Professional Responsibility in Cross-Profession
Practice, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 203 (1996); Andre R. Imbrogno, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 699 (1999) (summarizing State v. Tolais, 954 P.2d 907 (Wash. 1998), which analogizes
the mediator's ethical duties concerning conflicts of interest to those of an attorney);
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION & SOCIETY OF
PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCr FOR
MEDIATORS (1995), available at http:lwww.adr.orglrules/ethics/standard.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS].
53. MAY2001 DRAFT, supra note 2, § 8; [UMA §§ 7,9].
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to ideally know, in advance, whether the case presents personal,
ideological, or financial conflicts of interest, an aggrieved party would be
required to mount an expensive legal battle to prove the duty to disclose
its violation and the damages caused thereby.
Section 8(d)(1) of the UMA would require a mediator, prior to
accepting a case, to make a reasonable inquiry to determine "whether
there are any known facts that a reasonable individual would consider
likely to affect the impartiality of the mediator, including a financial or
personal interest in the outcome of the mediation and an existing or past
relationship with a mediation party or foreseeable participant in the
mediation."' This establishes an objective standard. Further, it does
not permit the mediator to hide behind a shield of ignorance. Thus, if a
mediator faces liability for violating section 8(d), the standard will not
only be whether the mediator actually knew of the present, past, or
foreseeable future conflict, but whether the mediator ought to have
known it. The mediator must then, as mandated in the paragraph (2)
that follows: "[D]isclose as soon as is practical before accepting a
mediation any such fact known."55 This is explained in the Reporter's
Notes as follows:
The goal of such a requirement is to protect the parties against a
mediator who, unbeknownst to the parties, is not impartial. No
sanctions are provided in the Act, but presumably the Act sets a
standard that could be a basis of liability if a party suffers
damage as a result of the mediator's failure to disclose conflicts. 6
1. Conflict of Interest Disqualifying the Attorney or Law Firm or Both
The broad prophylactic measures required under UMA section 8(d)
could have a significant impact on those attorneys who occasionally
serve as mediators. Section 8(d) fully comports with the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC) and
with the ABA Model Standards for Attorney-Mediators. UMA section
8(d) may even be read as extending to non-attorney mediators some of
the obligations that attorneys and attorney-mediators have labored
under for some time. Since there is no coherent body of case law to use
as a yardstick for mediator conduct, it is impossible to predict precisely
how section 8(d) of the UMA could restrict a mediator's practice.
54. Id. § 8(d)(1); [UMA § 9(a)(1)].
55. Id. § 8(d)(2); [UMA § 9(a)(2)].
56. Id. § 8 Reporter's Notes § 4.
[85:113
THOUGHTS ON THE UMA
There is, however, this body of case law for attorneys and some
suggestions may be present in the IVIRPC. The MRPC does not
expressly apply to mediators, but the language and concerns about
preserving privacy and fostering the trust of the parties are closely
analogous.
a. Concurrent Conflicts of Interest, the General Rule: MRPC 1.7
Every attorney owes her client a duty of undivided loyalty' and
complete assurance that all communications requiring protection will
remain confidential.' Rule 1.7 of the MRPC, pertaining to conflicts of
interest, prohibits an attorney from representing a client if it would be
"directly adverse" to another client or if the representation would
"materially limitf" the lawyer's responsibilities to another client's
interests or to the lawyer's own interests 9 It is possible to waive this
conflict of interest; however, waivers, are not automatic.' ° The lawyer
must "reasonably believe," as measured by an objective standard, that
the representation will not harm either client." Also, the lawyer must
fully disclose to both clients all of the foreseeable risks in this concurrent
representation.' Finally, both clients, preferably in writing, must agree
to waive the conflict.6
The next step of the analysis becomes whether UMA section 8(d),
interpreted through analogies to the MRPC, would impose a heavy
burden upon mediators. In fact, this would be a heavy burden for
mediators since it would require them to undertake affirmative steps to
ascertain whether the case involves factors that could handicap their
impartiality. If section 8(d) is adopted, mediators could not attempt to
seek shelter behind passive ignorance. Mediators could not simply say,
post facto, that they did not know that their spouse held shares in the
company that would benefit from the mediated settlement. Mediators
also could not claim that they did not realize that one of the parties to
the mediation was the defendant in a suit brought by another attorney in
their law firm. If this information were not plain on the face of the
initial referral, the mediator would have an obligation under UMA
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.7 (2001).
58. Id. R. 1.6.
59. Id. R. 1.7.
60. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. 5.





section 8(d) to find out whether such conflicts exist. This burden would
not be unreasonable since it would preserve the public's trust in the
private ordering that occurs behind closed doors in a mediation. This
trust is an essential element in the mediation field.
b. Self-Dealing in Conflicts of Interest: MRPC Rule 1.8
Since UMA section 8(d) is so brief, it does not take long before one
begins to ask the many questions that come to mind with respect to its
application in practice. The courts may again look to the MRPC for
guidance. The MR-PC provisions on conflicts of interest span three
different and lengthy rules.6' Rule 1.8 of the MR-PC, entitled
"Prohibited Transactions," focuses primarily on the possibility of
attorney self-dealing in client representation.' Section (b) is especially
pertinent to our discussion since it requires that an attorney not "use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of
the client unless the client has consented after consultation. '"1 Section
(g) clarifies that an attorney must not negotiate an aggregate settlement
of claims for or against multiple clients, unless the attorney has
individually consulted with each client.67 This consultation must include
full disclosure of the participation of each person in the settlement.6
Returning to UMA section 8(d), MRPC Rule 1.8 would suggest that
a mediator who has developed a fairly large practice in a specialized
area would have to be especially cautious to ensure that information
gained in one mediation did not 'leak' into another. It is, however,
standard, widespread practice for an evaluative mediator to offer parties
his assessment of what would likely work, or not work, based upon
experience in previous mediations. Furthermore, almost without
exception, the mediator has not received permission from the other
parties to use their 'story' in another mediation session with other
people. Perhaps even more troubling than the 'war stories' is the
possibility that a mediator might have indirectly learned important
information about a party's true bargaining range due to other
mediation work. If UMA section 8(a) is eventually interpreted through
the lens of MRPC Rule 1.8, or the proposed amended Rule 1.12, the
mediator would not be able to use this information to obtain a
64. Id. R. 1.7-1.9.
65. Id. R. 1.8.
66. Id. R. 1.8(b).
67. Id. R. 1.8(g).
68. Id.
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settlement.
This should not necessarily present an especially onerous restriction
on a mediator's negotiation style. A mediator must, however, be
particularly cautious since standards embodied in a uniform act do not
merely provide the basis for disciplinary action before an ethics
committee of one's professional trade association as in the case of a
MRPC violation. Instead, a violation of a UMA provision would
constitute a breach of the statute. Among other things, the mediator
might want to seriously consider whether their malpractice and liability
insurer would cover them for a statutory violation.
c. Successive Conflicts of Interest: MRPC Rule 1.9
In addition to assessing past relationships, UMA section 8(d) would
also require mediators to look forward to assure impartiality regarding
the participants. What conflicting associations are foreseeable? If a
mediator has not regularly maintained the type of computerized
conflicts check software program that law firms use, an astute mediator
might very much want to acquire one in a post-UMA environment. To
reiterate, the scattered number of mediation cases to date have not
elucidated clear doctrines concerning what is reasonable and
foreseeable. Nevertheless, the MRPC have revealed analogous issues.
MRPC Rule 1.9 addresses former clients and conflicts of interest and
has no counterpart in the earlier Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. This rule draws clear and enforceable lines to guide and
limit the attorney in successive representations. 9 Once the attorney has
established an attorney-client relationship with a person (including, of
course, an entity), the attorney is forbidden from representing anyone
else in "the same or substantially related matter" if the new person's
interests are "materially adverse" to the interests of the former client.70
It is possible that the former client would consent after consultation.7
With consent, the client waives their right to challenge the new
representation based on conflicts of interest, potential loss of
confidential information, or breach of the duty of loyalty owed to the
former client.' However, such waiver must be based upon full and fair
disclosure by the attorney, including an explanation of all the potential
69. Id. R. 1.9.
70. Id. R. 1.9(a).





This prohibition may also extend beyond the attorney to his or her
law firm.74 Additionally, the disqualification can travel with the lawyer
to his or her new firm.5 The reach of this 'contagion' depends upon the
type of work done for the previous client, the extent of the attorney's
direct involvement with the case, the attorney's access to confidential
information of the former client, whether the current matter is
substantially related to the former matter, and whether the new law firm
itself now intends to represent interests adverse to the migratory
lawyer's former client. It is conceivable that the firm can erect a
sufficiently high 'screen' to assure the migratory lawyer is effectively
quarantined from the case. However, the new law firm carries the
burden of proof, and this can be difficult to satisfy.
It is unclear how these same provisions and doctrines apply to the
attorney-mediator. It is increasingly commonplace for attorney-
mediators to mediate cases as a neutral. At a later time, this same
attorney, or this attorney's law firm, may be sought out to represent one
of the parties to that former mediation as an advocate, rather than as a
neutral. Do the doctrines developed concerning conflict of interest, as
embodied in the MRPC, permit this engagement? The Rule 2.4
proposed by the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission leaves little or no room
for doubt that the contagion of conflict can extend to an attorney-
mediator's law firm.
The majority of cases within the last several years have analyzed the
position of the attorney-mediator by the same, or even higher standards
established in the MRPC Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9. A higher standard
might be applied when the court elects to analyze the mediator's role as
more akin to that of a judge, a quasi-judicial capacity, reflecting the
neutrality of the mediator's position. If so, then the mediator's conduct
must be held to a higher standard imposed upon judges for testing
recusal. In this standard, it is asked whether there is the appearance of
impropriety, such that continued involvement in the case would
undermine the public's trust in the system of justice.
If UMA section 8(d) becomes law in a "Rules" jurisdiction, then the
ethical standards concerning disclosure, as required under the MRPC
Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9, may acquire the force and effect of law not only
in bar association disciplinary hearings, but also in the courts.
73. Id.
74. Id. R. 1.9(c).
75. Id. R. 1.9, cmt. 3-5.
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2. Illustrative Actions Interpreting the Conflicts of Interest Doctrine
For anyone who has been keeping track of ethical issues in
mediation, it comes as no surprise that standards would "grow teeth."
The trend is already underway. A Connecticut case illustrates the softer
treatment that attorney-mediators have expected in the past.76 The
Dzen brothers, John and Donald, engaged the services of Attorney John
Woodcock "to act as a mediator in order to facilitate the dissolution of
their family corporation and real estate partnership."' They signed a
written agreement setting forth the following ground rules that stated
that they would maintain the status quo: "[N]o changes being made in
the conduct of their business [and that all] profits will be divided on a
50150 basis.. . and [any] issues that arise with respect to the operation of
the business" would be submitted to Woodcock for his input.'
Four months later, while Woodcock was still acting as the mediator
for the proposed dissolution, brother John asked Woodcock to
represent his wife and himself in purchasing valuable property adjacent
to the Dzen family farm and business.79 The family corporation had
been leasing this particular property; therefore, use of this land was a
valuable corporate asset.' John Dzen breached the status quo
agreement by acquiring this asset.8' The court concluded that he did this
"to gain a tactical advantage in the mediation process. 82
The next question was attorney Woodcock's reasons for assisting
John in breaking the ground rules for the on-going mediation. It
appeared that Woodcock's actions constitute a prima facie conflict of
interest case in which he pursued the interests of John to the detriment
of Donald. Woodcock claimed that the notes in his mediation file
indicated that he did not act negligently in undertaking the
representation of John and his wife in the purchase of the adjacent
property.' The court rather complacently accepted this fairly bold
exculpatory assertion.'
If the case had been argued more closely using the Model Rules of
76. Dzen v. Dzen, CV 960061312S, 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 460 (Feb. 26,
1999).
77. Id. at *6.
78. Id. (alteration in original).
79. Id. at *7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *38-*39.
83. Id. at *11-*12.
84. Id. at *18-*19.
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Professional Conduct or the UMA as the measure of reasonable
behavior by an attorney, it seems that Woodcock would have been
found guilty of malpractice. There is no indication anywhere in the
record that he fully disclosed to the defendants, or clearly to the
plaintiff, that there was a potential for a conflict of interest.
Additionally, the record did not indicate that Woodcock had explained
his need to maintain neutrality and confidentiality or, further, that his
legal work representing either of them could imperil both his neutrality
and their confidences.
In fact, Woodcock's actions were quite the contrary. On March 26,
1996, the same day he was retained by the defendants, Woodcock's
notes state that John would prepare his own proposal, within thirty days,
for the division of the farms." On April 4, 1996, the transfer of title
went through, giving John and his wife ownership of the particular
property at issue." On May 7, 1996, the attorney of Donald Dzen, the
plaintiff, informed Woodcock by telephone that the corporation had
been renting the property that Woodcock helped John purchase."
Woodcock's notes indicate "genuine shock and surprise." "' He allegedly
did not believe that there was a conflict of interest between his role as
mediator and his representation of John and his wife, the defendants.'
There are a number of questions that arise in relation to this case
that implicate the standards under the UMA and the MRPC. These
include the following: Did this shock and surprise mitigate the ethical
violations, malpractice, or possible UMA violation that Woodcock
faced? Did Woodcock avoid entering conflict since he was not acting
knowingly? Can ignorance be bliss, or at least be an excuse? Under the
MRPC or the UMA, the standard would not be whether the attorney
knew or did not know, or whether he intended or did not intend to be
disloyal to one client in favor of another. This is a subjective standard
that is nearly impossible to enforce. Instead, what the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the UMA require is an objective standard.
The question is not merely what the attorney claimed to know but,
rather, based on the totality of the circumstances, what should an
attorney reasonably have known and done? Under the objective
standard of the UMA, it would not be sufficient for Woodcock to claim
85. Id. at *19.
86. Id. at *12.
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that he was genuinely shocked and surprised that John and his wife had
radically shifted the status quo. His shock and surprise, if indeed
genuine, would simply indicate that he had failed to keep sufficiently
informed about his client's case. Ignorance would be neither blissful nor
excusable. If he did not know, then he should have known.
In contrast to Connecticut, California courts have set forth a
stringent standard for attorney-mediators. The case of Cho v. Superior
Court90 is an illustrative example. In this case, a judge conducted a series
of three settlement conferences in which the parties spoke candidly
about the strengths and weaknesses of their case.9 Through these
candid discussions, Ms. Cho disclosed vital information, including her
"bottom line settlement."2 After the judge retired, he joined, as
counsel, the law firm that was representing the bank against Mrs. Cho.93
The firm imposed a "cone of silence" around the judge to address this
conflict of interest.4
The appellate court had to determine whether this "cone of silence"
was enough to expect the parties to believe that their confidences would
not be betrayed.9 The judge had used an evaluative model of
mediation, the dominant mode for civil-commercial mediation,
especially when a judge serves as the neutral.96 As described by the
California Appellate Court, an evaluative mediator will actively
participate in the negotiation process and, while not choosing sides, the
mediator does weigh in to the debate, shaping the direction and
outcomeY. In this capacity, the appellate court described the mediator's
role as follows:
[T]he mediator is not merely charged with being impartial, but
with receiving and preserving confidences in much the same
manner as the client's attorney. In fact, the success of mediation
depends largely on the willingness of the parties to freely disclose
their intentions, desires, and the strengths and weaknesses of
their case; and upon the ability of the mediator to maintain a
neutral position while carefully preserving the confidences that
90. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 1995).
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Given these descriptions of the role of an evaluative mediator, the
appellate court found it quite plain that the parties could not be
expected to believe that their confidences would not be betrayed either
directly or indirectly.'
No amount of assurances or screening procedures, no "cone of
silence" could ever convince the opposing party that the
confidences would not be used to its disadvantage. When a
litigant has bared its soul in confidential settlement conferences
with a judicial officer, that litigant could not help but be horrified
to find that the judicial officer has resigned to join the opposing
law firm-which is now pressing or defending the lawsuit against
that litigant."
The appellate court did not find that the judge or his law firm lacked
integrity; the court's focus was more elevated, looking to the integrity of
the ADR system as a whole. 0' "No one could have confidence in the
integrity of a legal process in which this is permitted to occur without
the parties' consent."'1 02
The amendments to MRPC Rule 1.12 proposed by the Ethics 2000
Commission reinforce this pervasive and deepening concern that
attorney mediators must be scrupulously forthright and have foresight
about possible conflicts of interest. Further, in those jurisdictions that
adopt the UMA's section 8(d), these matters would no longer be only a
matter of the bar's considered opinion. Rather, they would be a matter
of statutory law and its application.
B. A Consistent Role for the Mediator-No Switch to Evaluator or
Reporter
Section 8(a) of the UMA prohibits a mediator from providing "a
report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, [or] finding" regarding
the mediation. Additionally, according to section 8(a), the mediator
cannot switch roles from being the neutral facilitator of communication
98. Id. at 868.
99. Id. at 870.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 870 n.4.
102. Id. at 870.
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to being the surrogate for a court, agency, "or other authority that may
make a ruling" on the subject of the mediation.
This subject frequently arose in publications by the late Professor
Trina GriUo. For example, her article, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for WomenYO' laid a firm foundation for later critiques
of gender-based power imbalances in family mediation. She argued that
in some cases the mediator naturally allied himself with the husband,
allowing gender (and class) biases to subtly creep into the process."'
This was viewed as particularly pronounced and devastating in cases
involving undisclosed domestic violence.1" Professor Grillo's analysis
focused on cases from Northern California courts where mediation was
mandatory for child custody matters.1 ° More specifically, if the parents
could not reach a settlement, the mediator was empowered to make a
recommendation to the judge based on the mediator's own observations
of the parents during the session(s)."° Thus, the mediator had the power
to shift from a facilitator to an evaluator and then to an arbitrator,
whose decision could become binding."° As Professor Gribo describes,
this represents the greatest process danger for women.
A valuable correction to this injustice is proposed in section 8(a) of
the UMA." Indeed, it may be worthwhile to revisit the feminist and
critical legal studies (CLS) critiques of mediation to explore how much
of the negative assessment stems from this type of undisclosed,
pernicious power being invested within the mediator. It is not, however,
a concern that should be limited solely to those courts whose family
mediation programs included this type of report-back feature. Much of
the same dynamic can infiltrate a proceeding where the parties had
agreed by contract to use a therapist as mediator and, in the event of
impasse, a decision-maker. The public must rest assured that the
neutral in mediation will not subsequently change hats and become
nearly the de facto decision-maker. Section 8(a) of the UMA would
offer mediation participants this peace of mind.
- 103. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545 (1991).
104. Id. at 1590-92.
105. Id. at 1586-88.
106. Id. at 1552.
107. Id. at 1555.
108. See id.
109. MAY2001 DRAFr, supra note 2, § 8(d); [UMA § 9].
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C. A Party Representative Must be Permitted in Order to Re-balance
Power and Guard Against Coercion
1. Pro-Active Measures of Section 9 May Largely Obviate the Need for
Limited Mediator Confidentiality
Under section 9 of the UMA, any party who desires can have an
attorney or other representative at their side to attend, to participate, or
do both in a mediation.' This representative need not be merely an
observer. This designated party representative can "attend and
participate in the mediation." Even if a party had previously waived
their right to counsel, the party may freely, at their own determination,
rescind such waiver. To some, this will seem a small and almost non-
noteworthy addition to the UMA. Others, however, will recognize this
as a critical mechanism for re-balancing power in mediations and
thereby addressing one of the chief areas of criticism.
Mediation has, however, long been attacked by scholars of the CLS
movement and others as an inappropriate method to resolve disputes
involving minorities in American society."' Professor Richard Delgado,
a founder of the CLS movement, is the principal proponent of this
position. A fair way to capsulize their argument goes as follows:
Minorities in this country will always be the victims of oppression at one
level or another.12 For any minority person to obtain justice, they must
go to court, where the formal procedures and protections of the trial
system can re-balance power.' Mediation, on the other hand, will
simply provide a forum for re-victimization of the minority person.""
Mediation services offer only second-class justice, with no safeguards for
the minority victim."5
The CLS movement continues to challenge those committed to
developing mediation as a viable, just alternative to litigation. While
not all scholars concur in the CLS construct of perpetual victimhood for
minorities and perpetual oppression by the majority, UMA section 9
offers protection against this concern. Section 9 also provides needed
safeguards against the "strong arm" methods of some mediators, which
110. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 12, at 316; MAY 2001 DRAFT, supra note 2, § 9;
[UMA § 10].
111. Delgado, Conflict as Pathology, supra note 21.
112. See id. at 1400.
113. See id. at 1403.
114. See id. at 1402-04.
115. See id.
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result, on occasion, in agreements that are challenged for coercion,
duress, or fraud in the inducement.
2. Recent Case Law on Party Empowerment and Binding Agreements
One might question the desire to categorize the binding or non-
binding nature of a mediated settlement agreement as a matter of party
empowerment and mediation ethics, partially resolvable through the
adoption of UMA section 9. Is this not clearly and simply a matter of
procedural and contract law? Is this not proof of the case simply a
matter of allowing the mediator to testify as to the conduct and
communications during the session? Upon examining the line of cases
that explore this issue around the nation, one readily sees that the
underlying tests in all of these ostensibly contract cases turn on the
ethical conduct of parties, attorneys, and the mediator himself. A
number of courts now have considered whether a mediated agreement
should be enforced, even if one party attempts to repudiate it. Time and
again, the factors that these courts focus upon are factors that the ethics
codes for mediators also proscribe: 1) Did the mediator permit an
environment that was coercive? Was there direct or indirect duress? 2)
Did the mediator allow threats and intimidation to go unchecked? 3)
Did the mediator push or manipulate one or more of the parties in ways
that overbore the party's will? 4) Did the mediator fail to give each
party sufficient time and opportunity to secure all necessary information
before proceeding to an agreement? 5) Did the mediator fail to assure
that each party fully understood the terms of the agreement before
signing? 6) Did the mediator's version of the written settlement
agreement re-write or alter the parties' oral agreement?
The leading professional groups in mediation, the American
Arbitration Association, the ABA, and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution, have developed a combined "Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators." The first standard states that the mediator
must ensure that the principle of self-determination by the parties is
honored throughout the process. The agreement reached, if any, must
be "voluntary [and] uncoerced.16 To assure the exercise of free will,
the mediator must also permit any party to "withdraw from mediation at
any time. ,117
This principle will be honored in practice by having a designated
party representative present in the room, or at least available by




telephone, with sufficient breaks to facilitate telephone consultation
with the attorney/representative."' In a growing line of cases from all
sections of the United States, it is apparent that this has often been the
single most important determinant of whether a reviewing court will
permit repudiation by a party. Whether the party would succeed in the
suit depended upon whether the mediator could testify about their own
and the parties' conduct and communications during the session.
3. Illustrative Cases on Coercive Mediations
There is no absolute right to repudiate. Generally, courts prefer that
"voluntary agreements reached through mediation" be binding, rather
than non-binding."9 Otherwise, "many positive efforts to amicably settle
differences would be for naught.""' Thus, when parties have sought to
repudiate a mediated agreement, they must prove, usually through the
testimony of the mediator, that the agreement was not in fact voluntary.
In a recent Florida case, a lengthy mediation lasted several hours.'
The husband apparently had a "Woody Allen problem," a penchant for
taking Polaroid pictures of females of indeterminate, but clearly, young
age." During mediation, the wife sent the husband the following
threatening note: "If you can't agree to this, the kids will take what
information they have to whomever to have you arrested, etc. Although
I would get no money if you were in jail-you wouldn't also be living
freely as if you did nothing wrong.'' Two hours later, the parties
"settled" their property matters, with the wife receiving $128,000 in
marital assets, while the husband received $10,000.1' The husband then
sought later to repudiate the agreement on the basis that the
environment of the mediation had been hostile, threatening, coercive,
and that he had signed under duress."z The wife convinced the trial
judge that the note was merely "a wake up call," and that it did not
influence the resulting agreement. 6 The appellate court, however,
118. Nancy Rogers & Craig Ewen, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the
Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317
(1995) (articulating this solution in their article).
119. In re Marriage of Ames, 860 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id.
121. Cooper v. Austin, 750 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
122. Id. at 712 n.4.
123. Id. at 711.
124. Id. at 711-12.
125. Id. at 711.
126. Id.
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viewed Mrs. Cooper's behavior as extortion and determined that she
should not profit from such conduct, and vacated the agreement."V
The threatening note the wife provided to her husband during the
mediation may seem unusual. The reader, however, should consider the
frequency with which a spouse who has physically or psychologically
abused the other similarly threatens their partner during a mediation,
and the mediator is not aware of it. The fact that the wife wrote her
threat on paper furthers the remarkable nature of the coercion. Under
more typical circumstances, one might expect the threat to be a visual,
non-verbal cue from the abuser to the victim that would probably be
imperceptible, or at least undecipherable to the mediator. Nevertheless,
the coercion is just as real.
If Cooper v. Austin had occurred under the propsed UMA, section 9
would have assured the husband an opportunity to have a representative
with him to advise and possibly protect him in the session. The coercive
atmosphere could have been greatly diminished. Even if the husband's
representative did not provide legal advice, this person could have
intervened to compel needed breaks from the entire process, or private
sessions with the mediator. In those breaks, the husband could have
taken the needed time to develop an appropriate negotiating response.
In a private session with the mediator, he could have revealed her
threat. Either way, power could have been re-balanced in the process.
Oklahoma also offers an illuminating case that is much less titillating
than Cooper v. Austin. Indeed, by contrast, the exhausting session at
issue in Adams v. Adams"' probably does not sound all that unusual.
The prosaic nature of this coercion is what makes Adams so
troublesome. The mediation lasted for an entire day.29 The wife signed
the agreement, but shortly afterwards, sought to disavow the agreement
on account of coercion and duress.1" Further, she believed that she had
been defrauded."l The trial court denied the wife's desire for a new
trial.' The husband sought to enforce the agreement as an order of the
127. Id. at 713.
128. 11 P.3d 220 (Okla. Ct. App. 2000). Please note that this case was not
mediated under the court-connected mediation program operated under the auspices of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Dispute Resolution Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§§ 1801-1813 (West 1993).
129. Adams, 11 P.3d at 220.





court.'33 The appellate court reversed and remanded the trial court'sdecision."3
The appellate court voiced a number of concerns as reasons for its
decision. Like many mediations, whether civil-commercial or family,
the mediation was lengthy and heavy. Additionally, there was no
counsel to assist the wife, an important factor for examining the
usefulness of UMA section 9. Critical information was not shared
concerning the financial situation of the husband and wife. There was
only a simple recital of properties and debts. This recital alone did not
sufficiently explore how much weight should be accorded the fact that
the wife "discontinued her employment and presumably dedicated
herself to the marriage and its activities.. . .""' The court continued as
following: "Fairness in negotiation must include disclosure by both
parties of all matters relating to age, health, opportunities and
contributions of both parties, existence of all assets and their
location. "'36
UMA section 9 would have cured some of these problems and
assured Mrs. Adams the right to assistance. With the presence of an
attorney or other representative, Mrs. Adams would have experienced a
much greater opportunity for fairness. An attorney or representative
could have given her emotional, mental, and even physical support
through the grueling marathon session. There appeared to be a clear
imbalance of psychological and financial power between Mr. and Mrs.
Adams. A person at her side could have pressed for further information
long after she had been worn down by her husband's demands and
deceptions.
This case can be compared with a 1996 Florida case where it seemed
that the mediator did everything right, especially in using the wife's
attorney to help assure the fair operation of the session.37 Trowbridge
seems to illustrate a check-list of all the right things to do as well as
several ways that a mediator can work with a party's attorney to assure a
fair process. This checklist includes the following:
1) the mediation lasted approximately five hours; 2) there was a
break for lunch; 3) the atmosphere was not overbearing; 4) no
133. Id. at 222.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 221.
136. Id.
137. Trowbridge v. Trowbridge, 674 So. 2d 928, 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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threats were made; 5) the wife wanted the marital home, the
husband offered it, and the wife accepted; 6) the wife knew that
this was the final settlement of the case; 7) the wife's attorney
instructed her not to settle if she were not happy with the
settlement; 8) the mediator told the wife if she were not happy
with the settlement she could have a trial; 9) the mediator
dictated the settlement agreement for typing; 10) the wife's
attorney reviewed it with her; 11) the written agreement
completely and accurately reflected the oral agreement; 12) the
wife signed freely and voluntarily; 13) all participants signed the
agreement; and 14) the wife knew it would result in an
uncontested divorce.
Subsequently, only Mr. Trowbridge complied with the mediation
agreement.' 9 Mrs. Trowbridge sought additional payment for attorney's
fees, which was ultimately denied by the appellate court.' 40 A central
part of the court's reasoning was that the mediation itself had been fully
conducted in accord with ethical principles that ensured party self-
determination.14 ' Further, the presence and active involvement of the
wife's attorney vitiated any later claim of coercion, misinformation, or
other such claim. 2 This case is indicative of the idea that appropriately
educated attorneys can play a valuable role in assuring fairness and
predictability both in the courtroom and in the mediation room. UMA
section 9, if adopted, would go a long way towards assuring that
mediation serves as a complementary, as compared to a competitive,
attorney service.
V. CONCLUSION
Richard M. Nixon was the first American President to go to China
and initiate our still tentative and delicate relations. As a result of
Nixon's historically stern opposition to all things Communist, no one
could accuse him of being too "soft" on the People's Republic of China.
Despite long-standing apprehensions, this author was able to lend
tentative support to the UMA, a sign of hope for the future. It is
important to stress that if a UMA is to be adopted, there must be
recognition of the fact that the real issues confronting mediation are not
138. Id. at 929-30 (quoting the trial court's December 3, 1993 written order).
139. Id. at 930.
140. Id. at 929.
141. Id. at 931-32.
142. Id. at 931.
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necessarily the ones focused upon in the act to the exclusion of
everything else. Our primary work need not be to create a detailed
listing of all the confidentiality protections and waivers that should
apply in any given mediation. The practice of mediation, like
computerized electronic transfers, is growing so rapidly and in such
unpredictable ways that it may be folly to presently attempt to capture
the future in binding legislation.
Different emphases are called for if one looks at the real world of
mediation as experienced throughout the country, viewed through cases
that have proven sufficiently troublesome and resulted in civil litigation.
Rather than focus on ways to protect mediators from the aftermath of
mediations that mis-fire, an attempt should be made to focus on ways to
improve the fairness of the mediation process itself. An important
beginning is to assure the mediator's utter neutrality and impartiality.
Further, a party must not be coerced nor tricked into entering into a
mediation without legal representation or without the assistance of
some other person to help re-balance power. Finally, mediators must
ensure an environment that is non-threatening and where parties have
sufficient, unpressured opportunities to explore the information they
need to make good decisions for themselves. This may sound like an
extraordinarily modest request that is too prosaic to be worthy of a
uniform act. It may, however, be a truly revolutionary undertaking.
Instead of initially placing a heightened power in the hands of the
mediator, power would be left in the hands of the parties-where it has
always belonged.
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